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CHEMICALLY DEPENDENT EMPLOYEES AND
THE ADA IN THE MEDICAL PROFESSION:
DOES PATIENT SAFETY EXEMPT HOSPITAL EMPLOYERS
FROM COMPLIANCE UNDER THE DIRECT THREAT
AND/OR THE BUSINESS NECESSITY EXCEPTIONS?
JODI NELSON MEYER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)' and the North
Dakota Human Rights Act (NDHRA)2 deal with an employee's right to be
protected from discriminatory employment actions based on disability, and
the employer's responsibilities to a disabled employee. 3 Exactly what those
rights and responsibilities are, however, is far less than clear. What makes
matters less certain is when third party rights and safety issues are at stake,
such as a hospital employer dealing with physician or nurse employees who
have disabilities that may affect their ability to adequately care for patients.
The definitions and requirements of the ADA4 and NDHRA5 are
similar in their discussions of the responsibilities of employers in the work-
place, as they both seek to accomplish the same goal of precluding em-
ployment discrimination against qualified workers with disabilities. 6 As the
ADA is federal legislation and the rights afforded under NDHRA are
derived from the state, a litigant in North Dakota can initiate an action
under both the ADA and the NDHRA. The ADA is more expansive and
highly regulated as opposed to the NDHRA and is more developed through
case law. Despite the numerous judicial opinions issued in interpreting
these pieces of legislation, they remain confusing to most employers and
often most lawyers trying to assist employers in complying with these laws.
*Ms. Meyer is an attorney at the law firm of Camrud, Maddock, Olson & Larson Ltd. in
Grand Forks, ND. A majority of her practice focuses on assisting employers in North Dakota and
Minnesota comply with both federal and state employment laws.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-02.4 (2004).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117; N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-02.4. Additionally, the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 is applicable to federal employers and employers who receive federal funding.
29 U.S.C. 33 701-796(l) (2000). For purposes of this article, the Rehabilitation Act is not
discussed.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12111.
5. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117; N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-02.4.
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This article discusses the impact the ADA has on disability dis-
crimination cases in the medical arena, specifically disabilities derived from
chemical dependency. An employee with a chemical dependency disability
presents unique problems to an employer such as a hospital, where doctors
and nurses recovering from a drug addiction have access to narcotic medi-
cation and patient safety is of the highest priority. This article will address
what types of chemical dependency rise to the level of a "disability" as
defined and covered by the ADA, those types of chemical dependency that
are specifically excluded from coverage, the responsibilities of the employ-
er in reasonably accommodating a disabled chemically dependent em-
ployee, and when reasonable accommodation is precluded due to "direct
threat," "business necessity," and/or "undue hardship."
A. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The ADA is federal legislation that was enacted to prohibit employers
from discriminating against job applicants and employees on the basis of
disability.7 It applies to employers who have fifteen or more employees
working for twenty or more weeks during the current calendar year.8 The
ADA protects employees who are "qualified individuals with disabilities"
capable of performing the "essential functions" of the job in question with
or without "reasonable accommodation", from discrimination by the em-
ployer. 9 What these phrases mean in the context of the ADA, for employ-
ees with chemical dependency, and for employers in safety-sensitive areas
such as health care facilities, is explored in this article.
The ADA protects individuals who (1) have physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of the
individual, (2) have a record of such impairment, or (3) are regarded as
having an impairment, even if the employee does not actually have such an
impairment.10 Alcoholism is recognized as a disability under the ADA, al-
though it appears to be somewhat of a second-class disability and not
afforded quite the same level of protection as other disabilities. I
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117.
8. Id. § 12111(5)(A).
9. Id. § 12111(8).
10. Id. § 12102(2).
II. See id. § 12114(c)(l) (authorizing an employer to prohibit alcohol consumption in the
workplace and require its employees not to be under the influence at work); id. § 12114(c)(4)
(indicating job performance and qualification standards for alcoholic employees are the same as
other employees, even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the alcoholism.)
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B. NORTH DAKOTA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
In North Dakota, the NDHRA makes it an illegal, discriminatory
practice to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge or accord adverse or unequal
treatment to someone with a "physical or mental disability."12 Disability is
defined as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities, a record of this impairment, or being regarded as
having this impairment." 13 NDHRA does not address whether chemical de-
pendency is covered nor does its accompanying case law.
14
Similar to the ADA, the NDHRA requires reasonable accommodation
except when doing so would (1) unduly disrupt or interfere with the em-
ployer's normal operations, (2) threaten the health or safety of the indi-
vidual with a disability or others, (3) contradict a business necessity of the
employer, or (4) impose undue hardship on the employer, based on the size
of the employer's business, the type of business, the financial resources of
the employer, and the estimated cost and extent of the accommodation.
15
Under the NDHRA, it is not a discriminatory practice to fail or refuse to
hire or discharge based on physical or mental disability, if it is "a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise ....
II. TYPES OF CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY THAT QUALIFY AS A
"DISABILITY" UNDER THE ADA
Although persons afflicted with alcoholism or recovering from other
drug abuse are generally covered by the ADA, an employee's chemical use
or abuse must still rise to the level of a "disability" as defined under the
ADA.17 This means that the person must be substantially limited in a major
life activity due to chemical dependency.18 Further, different types of
chemical dependency are treated differently under the law.
12. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2004).
13. Id. § 14-02.4-02(4).
14. Id. §§ 14-02.4-01 to 14-02.4-23; see also Soentgen v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, 467
N.W.2d 73, 81 (N.D. 1991) (assuming arguendo that "if alcoholism and drug addiction are
handicaps" under the NDHRA, the hospital had a bona fide occupational qualification regarding
patient safety that the alcoholic doctor could not meet).
15. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02(15).
16. Id. § 14-02.4-08.
17. See Nancy J. Wolf, Chemical Dependency-Accommodation Under the ADA, in UPPER
MIDWEST EMPLOYMENT LAW INSTITUTE HANDBOOK, 1, 3 n.6 (2004) (citing EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 2.2 (1992);
McCleod v. City of Detroit, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 225, 229 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (holding
protections extend only to those chemical users meeting the definition of a disabled person)).
18. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2004); see also infra Part lI.D.
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A. ALCOHOLISM IS A RECOGNIZED IMPAIRMENT THAT MAY BE A
DISABILITY
Alcoholism is a recognized impairment under the ADA.19 Mere im-
pairment, however, is insufficient for coverage under the ADA.20 A claim-
ant suffering from alcoholism must "demonstrate that his impairment
substantially limits one or more of his major life activities."21 What exactly
this means is no easy task for an employer to determine. An employee who
has previously received treatment or gone through rehabilitation would
most certainly qualify as he would have a record of impairment, which
automatically triggers coverage under the ADA.22 Rehabilitation may in-
clude in-patient or outpatient treatment, as well as somewhat regular
attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.
B. ILLEGAL DRUG USE MAY OR MAY NOT BE A DISABILITY
Illegal drug use is specifically exempted from ADA coverage. 23 This
includes illegal drugs,24 as well as the illegal use of legal drugs such as
abusing prescription medication. 25 Therefore, an employee who is illegally
abusing drugs presently is not covered by the ADA.
However, an employee who was dependent on either prescription or
illegal drugs is covered by the ADA if he is not presently using and has
been, or is presently, in a drug treatment program. 26 Further, such an em-
ployee would be entitled to ADA coverage if rehabilitated (with or without
treatment) and no longer abusing drugs.27
C. AN EMPLOYEE "REGARDED AS" HAVING A CHEMICAL
DEPENDENCY DISABILITY IS COVERED BY THE ADA
If an employee is suspected of having a drug or alcohol problem, the
ADA will apply and an employer could be liable for any discriminatory
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12114 (2000).
20. Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., 358 F.3d 110, 114 (1st Cir. 2004).
21. Id. at 114-15.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2000).
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(a)(2) (2004).
24. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(a)(1) (defining "controlled
substance").
25. See Wolf, supra note 17, at 2 n.4 (stating "[tlhe law refers to 'illegal use' of drugs-not
to 'use of illegal drugs.' Thus, the drug may be legal, but if an employee is using it illegally (e.g.
without a prescription), the employee is not protected by the ADA and is not eligible for
reasonable accommodations.").
26. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(b).
27. Id.
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treatment of the employee as a result. 28 For example, if an employer be-
lieves an employee is an alcoholic and terminates him because of that, it is
an ADA violation even though the employee was not actually an alcoholic.
The reasoning is based on the fact that the employer terminated the em-
ployee for a discriminatory reason, even though it did not actually exist.
D. A VALID CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY QUALIFIES AS A DISABILITY
WHEN IT SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTS A "MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY"
As mentioned, an employee with an alcohol or drug impairment must
be substantially limited in a major life activity to trigger coverage under the
ADA.29 What constitutes a major life activity is something that is con-
tinuously being defined by the courts. 30 Traditionally, major life activities
are construed to be those of "central importance to daily life," such as
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, performing manual tasks, lifting, and
reaching. 31
The United States Supreme Court has not yet recognized work as a
major life activity. 32 The Eighth Circuit, however, eludes that working may
be deemed a major life activity. 33 In Moysis v. DTG Datanet,34 a worker
suffered a brain injury that impaired his concentration and short-term
memory and necessitated routine.35 The Eighth Circuit concluded this
need, along with his concentration, memory, and interaction problems, were
activities that involved "the major life activities of learning and working."
36
As work may be the main, or only, activity substantially affected by chem-
ical dependency (such as going to work impaired or being continuously
tardy due to hangovers), whether work is recognized as a "major life
activity" is an important consideration.
An employer may, however, hold an alcoholic employee to the same
qualification standards for job performance and behavior as other employ-
ees, even if the unsatisfactory performance is related to the alcoholism.
37
As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit points out, arguing that job
performance deficiencies are evidence that alcoholism substantially impairs
28. See id.
29. See supra Part H.A.
30. E.g., Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., 358 F.3d 110, 115 (1st Cir. 2000).
31. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002).
32. Sullivan, 358 F.3d at 115.
33. Moysis v. DTG Datanet, 278 F.3d 819, 825 (8th Cir. 2002).
34. 278 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 2002).
35. Moysis, 278 F.3d at 822.
36. Id. at 824 (quoting Emerson v. N. States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 511, 512 (7th Cir.
2001)) (emphasis added).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c) (2004).
2004]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
one's ability to work may actually demonstrate that the worker cannot meet
the legitimate requirements of the job and is therefore not entitled to ADA
coverage. 38
III. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION OF A CHEMICAL
DEPENDENCY DISABILITY
Generally, the main reasonable accommodation of a chemically de-
pendent employee would be a leave of absence or modified work schedule
for treatment of the addiction. The employer is not required to hold the de-
pendent employee to lower work performance standards as other similarly-
situated employees as a reasonable accommodation. 39
A. NO REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION IS REQUIRED IF A DIRECT
THREAT EXISTS
Although impaired, a person is not a "qualified individual with a
disability" under the ADA if they pose a direct threat. 40 In the case of
hospitals, clinics, or other care giving facilities, this "direct threat" would
be to the health and safety of the patients. "Direct threat" is defined as "a
significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by
reasonable accommodation." 41
Certainly in the case of hospitals, clinics, or other care giving facilities,
a direct threat to patient safety exists when a treating nurse or physician is
under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol. In the medical context, the risk
this poses to patients appears to be enough to satisfy the direct threat
exemption of the ADA.42 In Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc.43 from
the Seventh Circuit, patients and co-workers complained of Dr. Bekker
smelling of alcohol while at work.44 Dr. Bekker had previously been
treated for "problematic alcohol usage" but not abuse.4 5 Dr. Bekker had
complied with the recommended treatment and then resumed social
drinking.4 6 After reviewing patient complaints and speaking with co-
workers, the employer concluded that Dr. Bekker posed a risk to patients
38. Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., 358 F.3d 110, 115-16 (1st Cir. 2000).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4).
40. Id. § 12111(3).
41. Id.
42. Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 229 F.3d 662, 670-72 (7th Cir. 2000); Judice v.
Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 919 F. Supp. 978, 984 (E.D. La. 1996); Altman v. N.Y. City Health &
Hosps. Corp., 903 F. Supp. 503, 508, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
43. 229 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2000).
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and therefore terminated her.47 No urine or other alcohol or drug tests were
conducted prior to this decision although the court noted that testing is the
only conclusive means to determine whether Dr. Bekker was actually under
the influence of alcohol while at work.4 8 The court went on, however, to
find that the employer was reasonable in its termination of Dr. Bekker as
based on the numerous reports of alcohol odor; ample evidence therefore
existed to show that Dr. Bekker was a direct threat to patient safety.49 The
burden therefore shifted to Dr. Bekker to show that she was not a direct
threat,50 and the court concluded that she failed to do so. 5 1 Basically, the
employer's argument was that a non-alcoholic employee would have been
fired for smelling of alcohol on the job, and so there was no discrimina-
tion. 52 There was no discussion by the court as to whether the employer's
knowledge of Dr. Bekker's prior treatment caused them to be unreasonably
paranoid, resulting in disparate treatment.53
A similar safety-sensitive position case was Martin v. Barnesville
Exempted Village School District Board of Education.54 The Sixth Circuit
held that a senior union worker, otherwise qualified for an elementary bus
driver position, was not discriminated against when denied the job because
three years earlier he had been observed drinking beer on the job as a
custodian at the school.55 The court found that the worker presented a
serious risk and the school was not obligated to run the risk of an accident
that would injure children.56 From the facts as stated in this case, the
worker was observed drinking on the job once as a custodian, and he
worked for the school district as a bus driver for seven years prior to his job
as a custodian apparently without incident.57 There was no discussion by
the court of whether the worker posed a "direct threat" under the magic
47. Id. at 667.
48. Id. at 668.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 672 (describing the burden shifting standard of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973)). McDonnell Douglas established that the employee has the initial burden of
demonstrating a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. If that is accomplished, the burden then
shifts to the employer to demonstrate that they had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or retaliatory
reason for the employment action. Id. If the employer establishes a legitimate reason, the
employee must then establish that this reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.
51. Id. at 673.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 209 F.3d 931 (6th Cir. 2000).
55. Martin, 209 F.3d at 932-33.
56. Id. at 934.
57. Id. at 932, 934. Due to a union settlement with the school district, the employee was able
to keep his job as long as he went through chemical dependency treatment. Id. at 934. The em-
ployee was therefore covered under the ADA as having a "record of impairment." Id.
2004]
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ADA language, 58 even though prior case law warned that "mere assertion of
such a threat will not do: this determination must be based on 'an indi-
vidualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform
the essential functions' of the position."' 59 Rather, the court simply stated
that "the ADA does not protect plaintiff from his own bad judgment in
drinking on the job."60 This is an interesting comment if one considers
alcoholism a disease, which is how it is recognized under the ADA, rather
than simply bad judgment. Specifically in cases of other jurisdictions that
have addressed direct threat in the medical profession, a direct threat has
been found to exist excusing the employer from liability for discrimination,
although in those cases the physician employees made numerous rehabili-
tation attempts and were presently abusing alcohol at the time of their
termination.61
B. NO REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION IS REQUIRED IF A BUSINESS
NECESSITY PRECLUDES IT
An employer may screen out or otherwise deny a job to an individual
with a disability if consistent with that employer's business necessity.62
Safety of third parties is, of course, a business necessity of hospitals and
other care facilities. The question, then, is whether a hospital employer
must show that a particular employee with a chemical dependency dis-
ability is an actual direct threat to avoid ADA liability, or if the hospital can
simply preclude such employees from certain positions based on the
business necessity of safety.
This question of direct threat versus safety as a business necessity was
presented to the Fifth Circuit by a non-medical but safety-sensitive em-
ployer.63 In EEOC v. Exxon Corp.,64 the corporation had a policy that
precluded all employees who had ever undergone substance abuse treatment
from certain safety-sensitive positions that had little supervision. 65 The
policy was adopted after the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill and resulted in the
58. Id. (holding that the school had "articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its actions" and plaintiff had not demonstrated that this stated reason is a pretext for any unlawful
discrimination).
59. Judice v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 919 F. Supp. 978, 982 (E.D. La. 1996) (emphasis
added).
60. Martin v. Barnesville Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 209 F.3d 931, 934 (6th Cir.
2000).
61. Judice, 919 F. Supp. at 978; Altman v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 903 F. Supp.
503, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2004).
63. EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871, 872 (5th Cir. 2000).
64. 203 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2000).
65. Exxon, 203 F.3d at 872.
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demotion of some employees who had been in safety-sensitive positions
prior to the new policy and who were apparently working without inci-
dent.66 Exxon argued that it need not show each and every employee with a
substance abuse past posed a direct threat to the safety of the corporation,
but that safety was a business necessity that justified the screening out of
such individuals for those jobs.67 Exxon cited the damages, including puni-
tive and criminal sanctions, environmental concerns, and tort liability, that
would be incurred if an employee had a relapse on the job and caused an
accident. 68
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Exxon and held that
direct threat alone was not the only defense for precluding an employee
disabled by substance abuse from a certain position. 69 While a direct threat
analysis would apply to an individual employee, "business necessity ad-
dresses whether the qualification standard can be justified as an across-the-
board requirement." 70 Some considerations an employer should analyze
when evaluating business necessity of such a policy are the "magnitude of
possible harm and the probability of occurrence." 71 "The acceptable proba-
bility of an incident will vary with the potential hazard posed by the par-
ticular position."72 Thus, in a hospital setting, situations that may justify
such a policy would include dangerous situations caused by an employee
under the influence, such as over or under medicating a patient, or causing
injury with medical tools during procedures (such as intubation, catheriti-
zation, or surgery).
A similar rationale was applied by the North Dakota Supreme Court in
Soentgen v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, P.C.73 In Soentgen, the NDHRA was
at issue, rather than the ADA.74 A doctor was suspected of smelling of al-
cohol while at work, and there were other work-qualification concerns.75
While only assuming arguendo that alcoholism was covered by the
NDHRA and that Soentgen was otherwise a qualified worker with a
disability, the court stated that the clinic's action in terminating her was
nonetheless justified based on "a bona fide occupational qualification
66. Id.
67. Id. at 873.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 875.
70. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2004)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 467 N.W.2d 73, 73 (N.D. 1991).
74. Soentgen, 467 N.W.2d at 73.
75. Id. at 76. Patient care and lack of training were also raised as concerns. Id.
20041
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reasonably necessary" for a physician. 76 An analysis of this discussion
suggests that the "'bona fide occupational qualification reasonably neces-
sary' for a physician" would be sobriety, and because Soentgen was under
the influence of alcohol on the job, there was no discrimination.77
Additionally, as was the case in Soentgen, if an employee is actually
under the influence at work, the employer need not worry about the ADA,
nor presumably the NDHRA. The ADA does not protect workers who are
under the influence at work, and the worker could therefore simply be
terminated for violation of company policy.78 Again, however, this puts the
employer in the untenable position of having to wait until a worker comes
to work under the influence and patient safety has already been
compromised or worse, an accident has already occurred.
There is no guidance found in Soentgen that suggests how the North
Dakota Supreme Court would apply the NDHRA to a policy, such as that
found in Exxon, wherein all physicians, nurses, or other health care workers
with little supervision and who have substance abuse pasts would be
precluded from employment. Exxon, after all, was not that expansive and
involved only "safety sensitive" jobs such as those in its transportation
department.79 There were apparently other positions available for workers
displaced by the policy, though not necessarily comparable.80 In a hospital,
however, a physician or nurse unable to treat patients would most likely be
precluded from employment altogether.
A case out of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
suggests such an expansive policy would be unacceptable, wherein an indi-
vidualized assessment of the exact job requirements and the applicant in
question was required.8l That case, however, is sufficient in factual and
legal distinction to leave room for argument.82
In Wallace v. Veterans Administration, et al.,83 a registered nurse (RN)
was precluded from a position in the intensive care unit as she was a
recovering drug addict, and her personal physician had placed work restric-
tions upon her as a result, prohibiting her from accessing or administering
narcotic medication to patients.8 4 The employer believed that narcotic
76. Id. at 81.
77. Id.
78. See id. (assuming the employer has a Drug and Alcohol Free Workplace policy).
79. EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871, 872 (5th Cir. 2000).
80. Id. at 871. The facts specifically use the word "demoted," which could indicate less pay,
a lower status, or both. Id. at 872.
81. Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 766 (D. Kan. 1988).
82. Id.
83. 683 F. Supp. 758 (D. Kan. 1988).
84. Wallace, 683 F. Supp at 760.
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administration was an essential function of the position and did not hire
her.8 5 The applicant sued under the Rehabilitation Act, 86 which is similar in
its requirements to the ADA,87 and applied to the position due to the
hospital's federal status. 88 The court ruled in favor of the applicant, holding
that because only approximately two percent of an RN's work involved
narcotic administration, finding someone else to administer narcotics for
this particular applicant was not an unreasonable accommodation. 89 The
court's holding was based solely on whether or not the applicant was able to
perform the essential job functions with or without a reasonable accom-
modation.90 The hospital's position that patient care would be compro-
mised was discussed only in the context of the applicant's narcotic
administration restriction. 91 There was no discussion of a potential for re-
lapse by the applicant, resulting in a concern for patient safety in the context
of safety as a business necessity.92
C. NO REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION IS NECESSARY IF AN UNDUE
HARDSHIP EXISTS
An employer is likewise not required to accommodate a disabled
employee if undue hardship exists. 93 For example, the amount of time,
energy, and expense that would be involved with monitoring a physician,
nurse, or other health care worker, who was a relapse concern, would be
taken into consideration when determining a hospital's or employer's re-
sponsibilities under the ADA.94 Such considerations may include the type
of practice, patient access, drug access, and responsibility of the particular
employee in supervision of others. 95 Of the cases analyzed, this argument
is the least mentioned by courts in their discussion of ADA accommodation
85. Id. at 759.
86. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-718 (2000).
87. The Rehabilitation Act provides coverage for an "individual with a disability," defined as
"any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(A)-(B) (2000). Alcoholism and drug addiction
are recognized under the Rehabilitation Act. See Tinch v. Walters, 765 F.2d 599, 604 (6th Cir.
1985).
88. Wallace, 683 F. Supp. at 760.
89. Id. at 765-66 (rejecting the hospital's argument that such accommodation would be
unduly burdensome, result in hiring of additional staff, and compromise staff morale and patient
care).
90. Id. at 766.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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of employees with chemical dependency disabilities. 96 Direct threat and the
safety qualification of business necessity are raised most often by employ-
ers and, consequently, discussed most often by the courts.9
7
IV. CONCLUSION
While an employer's responsibilities and an employee's rights under
the ADA have been developed through case law, they are, unfortunately,
still not clear regarding safety-sensitive positions and at what point the
safety of a third party takes priority over accommodating an employee with
a chemical dependency disability. Chemical dependency disabilities enjoy
less protection than other disabilities under the ADA, and policies pro-
hibiting such workers from safety-sensitive positions have been upheld as a
business necessity in other circuits. Certainly the business necessity
exemption applied in Exxon, if applied more broadly, would be a more
preemptive measure for employers, but would also have a more discrimi-
natory effect on employees. Whether such an expansive policy of pro-
hibiting all workers with chemical dependencies from treating patients
would be accepted remains to be seen. Therefore, until the ADA and
NDHRA are clarified through either further legislation or judicial
interpretation, hospitals and employers remain in the untenable position of
weighing the risk of tort liability for accidents resulting from a relapsed
employee versus the risk of discrimination liability under the ADA and
possibly the NDHRA.
96. Although if utilized, the employer must adequately consider feasible accommodations,
and they cannot merely offer undue hardship as a justification without objective evidence. See
Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 766 (D. Kan. 1988) (stating contentions of an
inability to accommodate should be supported with objective evidence, and not merely
speculation).
97. See supra Part I.A-B.
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